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INTRODUCTION 
In his Article “Sex in the City,” Professor Sean Hannon Williams 
addresses the problems of enormous trial court discretion and 
concomitant unpredictable and inconsistent decisions found in 
divorce cases by proposing that local governments adopt nonbinding 
“rules of thumb” that would guide judges in exercising that discretion 
with respect to issues such as child custody, property division, and 
income support.1  He contends that this proposal would fit within the 
existing legal framework of state-local relations and would advance 
the goals of both family law reform and local empowerment with 
respect to family issues.2  Specifically, he urges that local legislative 
action could be a significant step towards the “rulification” reform 
that state legislatures have so far been unable to achieve, while also 
serving as a springboard for greater local government participation in 
a range of issues relevant to family welfare.3  It is an intriguing 
proposal.  My comment focuses on two issues: (i) local power to act 
                                                                                                                                         
* Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia University School of 
Law. 
 1. Sean Hannon Williams, Sex in the City, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1107, 1111 
(2016). 
 2. See id. at 1110-12. 
 3. See id. at 1123. 
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on family law matters, specifically the consequences of divorce; and 
(ii) the appropriate role for local legislative bodies in addressing these 
issues. 
I.  FAMILY LAW LOCALISM: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
As Professor Williams explains, family law localism presents two 
distinct but overlapping questions—whether there is local power to 
act in the first place, and whether, even if in theory a local 
government has power to legislate on the subject, it has the further 
power to prevent state preemption of the local measure.4  These are 
sometimes referred to as the powers of initiative and immunity, or the 
sword and the shield.5  The two issues overlap because, as is often the 
case, if the relevant state constitutional or statutory provisions are 
unclear, courts tend to turn to similar criteria—the costs and benefits 
of statewide uniformity versus local variation; external effects of local 
actions; history; and relative institutional capacity—for both 
questions.6  The two issues are different, though, because there are 
many matters that are “local enough” that a local government may 
have power to address them in the first instance, but that are also 
“state enough” that the state can displace local action. 
A. Local Initiative 
Starting with local power to act, the general background norm in 
the United States is Dillon’s Rule, which provides that a local 
government possesses only those powers (i) expressly delegated to it 
by the state, (ii) necessarily implied in or incident to the express 
delegation, or (iii) essential to accomplish the expressly delegated 
powers.7  Although Dillon’s Rule has been supplanted by home rule 
for most cities and some counties in many states,8 it remains the 
governing principle wherever home rule has not been provided.9  
                                                                                                                                         
 4. See id. at 1135. 
 5. See, e.g., RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 346-432 (8th ed. 2016). 
 6. See id. 
 7. See id. at 327. 
 8. See, e.g., State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1126 (Utah 1980) (criticizing 
Dillon’s Rule as “antithetical to effective and efficient local and state government.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Hugh Spitzer, “Home Rule” vs. “Dillon’s Rule” for Washington 
Cities, 38 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 809, 856 (2015) (noting that although the state 
constitution and statutes vest home rule powers in many Washington cities, 
“Washington should be considered a ‘Dillon’s Rule state’ for its special purpose 
districts, non-charter counties, and the state’s nine non-code cities and sixty-nine 
towns”). 
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Virginia, for example, remains a Dillon’s Rule state, and, as a result, 
tends to read local regulatory powers narrowly,10 and Dillon’s Rule 
continues to be invoked in many other states, including recent 
examples in Illinois,11 South Dakota,12 and Vermont.13  For a Dillon’s 
Rule city or county, any local powers with respect to family law are 
likely to be closely cabined to the authority expressly granted by the 
state.  Thus, in Virginia, the state supreme court concluded that the 
state law authorizing counties to provide the dependents of county 
employees with health benefits did not give the county authority to 
provide dependent benefits to the unmarried domestic partners of 
county employees, even though the benefits were funded solely by the 
county.14 
Many states provide some cities and counties with a broader grant 
of power to act over a range of issues without having to obtain 
specific state authorization.  This is known as home rule.15  Home rule 
can result from a state constitutional amendment, state legislation, or 
even from expansive state judicial interpretation of legislative 
grants.16 Home rule classically takes two forms.  Early versions of 
home rule, dating back to the late nineteenth century, sought to 
provide municipalities with both authority to take action and 
protection from state displacement in the area of “local” or 
“municipal” affairs.17  In other words, this type of home rule 
combined initiative with immunity.  Building off a United States 
Supreme Court reference to such an early home rule measure as 
creating an “imperium in imperio,”18 this is known as imperio home 
                                                                                                                                         
 10. See, e.g., Marble Tech., Inc. v. City of Hampton, 690 S.E.2d 84 (Va. 2010) 
(holding in absence of express or implied grant of authority from state legislature, 
locality may not use certain criteria in designating a resource protection area); Bd. of 
Zoning Appeals v. Bd. of Supervisors, 666 S.E.2d 315 (Va. 2008) (holding in absence 
of specific grant of authority, zoning appeals board lacks power to bring declaratory 
judgment action); Bd. of Supervisors of Augusta Co. v. Countryside Inv. Co., 522 
S.E.2d 610 (Va. 1999) (holding state law allowing counties to impose requirements 
for subdivision of land did not authorize denial of subdivision approval on basis that 
development would destroy county’s rural environment). 
 11. See, e.g., Tri-Power Res. Inc. v. City of Carlisle, 967 N.E.2d 811, 813 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2012) (non-home-rule municipalities in Illinois are subject to Dillon’s Rule). 
 12. See, e.g., Olesen v. Town of Hurley, 691 N.W.2d 324, 328-29 (S.D. 2004) 
(holding state law authorizing municipalities to operate bars that sell alcohol by the 
drink “does not imply a necessary power” to offer meals at such a bar). 
 13. See, e.g., City of Montpelier v. Barnett, 49 A.3d 120, 127-29 (Vt. 2012). 
 14. See Arlington Co. v. White, 528 S.E.2d 706 (Va.  2001). 
 15. See, e.g., BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 5, at 346. 
 16. See, e.g., State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1126 (Utah 1980). 
 17. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 5, at 346-47. 
 18. City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465, 468 (1893). 
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rule.19  Although providing locally-initiated measures with immunity 
from state displacement should have created a powerful foundation 
for local autonomy, in practice state courts were reluctant to 
immunize local actions from state regulation.20  As a result, the notion 
of “local” or “municipal” affairs often received narrow 
interpretations in both the initiative and immunity settings.  In 
response, in the mid-twentieth century local autonomy advocates 
developed a new home rule form that sought to strengthen local 
initiative power at the price of relinquishing local immunity claims.  
Known as “legislative home rule,” this type of home rule provides 
that a home rule local government can exercise all legislative powers 
that the state could delegate unless and until a power is taken back by 
the state.21  Most modern home rule enactments have been of the 
legislative form, although in practice some state constitutions blur 
these theoretically sharp distinctions and use a mix of both imperio 
and legislative language.22 
Under legislative home rule, most contested issues are preemption 
questions rather than local-power-to-act-in-the-first-place issues, 
which would provide some support for family law localism, at least in 
the first instance. However, some legislative home rule provisions 
contain a further qualification, based on a proviso in the National 
Municipal League’s model home rule amendment, that the broad 
delegation of powers “shall not include the power to enact private or 
civil laws governing civil relationships except as incident to the 
exercise of an independent power.”23  This idea that regulating 
“private or civil law governing civil law relationships” is inherently 
beyond the scope of local power is an old one, and was part of the 
analysis of local or municipal affairs in imperio states.24  Although an 
obviously vague concept, it almost surely encompasses family law, 
including the consequences of divorce.  The two most quoted dicta 
concerning this phrase were uttered by Benjamin Cardozo, when he 
was chief judge of the New York Court of Appeals, and Chief Judge 
Arthur Vanderbilt of the New Jersey Supreme Court. According to 
Chief Judge Cardozo: 
There are other affairs exclusively those of the state, such as the law 
of domestic relations, of wills, of inheritance, of contracts, of crimes 
                                                                                                                                         
 19. See, e.g., BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 5, at 347. 
 20. See, e.g., id. at 347-48. 
 21. See, e.g., id. at 348. 
 22. See, e.g., id. at 348-50. 
 23. See, e.g., id. at 364-75. 
 24. See, e.g., id. at 372-75. 
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not necessarily local (for example, larceny or forgery), the 
organization of courts, the procedure therein.  None of these things 
can be said to touch the affairs that a city is organized to regulate, 
whether we have reference to history or to tradition or to the 
existing forms of charters.25 
Relying on Cardozo’s statement, Chief Judge Vanderbilt observed: 
Provisions for home rule have not given omnipotence to local 
governments.  Matters that because of their nature are inherently 
reserved for the State alone and among which have been the master 
and servant and landlord and tenant relationships, matters of 
descent, the administration of estates, creditors’ rights, domestic 
relations, and many others of general and statewide significance, are 
not proper subjects for local treatment under the authority of the 
general statutes.  The broad grant of power . . . relates to matters of 
local concern . . . not to those matters involving state policy or in the 
realm of affairs of general public interest and applicability . . . The 
limitation upon legislative power is in the subject itself, and not in 
the nature or character of the political subdivision to which the grant 
is made.26 
To be sure, as Professor Williams has observed,27 many local 
government actions can affect common law private or civil 
relationships.  Local housing codes can be considered by courts in 
landlord-tenant disputes, local zoning ordinances can influence the 
resolution of nuisance cases, and local consumer protection or anti-
discrimination measures can play a role in determining the outcome 
of other tort actions.28  So, too, the exception to the limitation on 
local power to enact laws governing civil relationships for measures 
“incident to an exercise of an independent” local power could provide 
authorization for local laws grounded in the grant of police power to 
promote the local general welfare—such as the well-being of children 
affected by divorce—that “incidentally” affect private or civil 
                                                                                                                                         
 25. Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 713 (N.Y. 1929) (emphasis added). 
 26. Wagner v. Mayor & Council of Newark, 132 A.2d 794, 800-01 (N.J. 1957) 
(quoting Paul v. Gloucester Co., 50 N.J.L. 585, 601-02 (Ct. Err. & App. 1888) 
(emphasis supplied). 
 27. See Williams, supra note 1, at 1143. 
 28. See, e.g., Paul A. Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action, 64 STAN. L. 
REV. 1109 (2012); Gary T. Schwartz, The Logic of Home Rule and the Private Law 
Exception, 20 UCLA L. REV. 671 (1973).  But see McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, 570 
A.2d 834 (Md. 1990) (invalidating local employment discrimination ordinance); 
Bannerman v. City of Fall River, 461 N.E.2d 793 (Mass. 1984) (invalidating local 
regulation of the conversion of rental units to condominiums on private/civil 
relationships grounds). 
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relationships.29  Still, the concept of “incidental” may be key; local 
measures intended to directly influence the determination of state-
law rights, such as those of divorcing marital partners with respect to 
their children, property, and ongoing post-divorce obligations in state 
civil litigation, may go to the heart of the private/civil law limitation 
on local power to act.30  Perhaps the safest thing to say is that given 
the vagueness of both the private/civil law limitation and the incident-
to-independent-power exception to the limitation, it is uncertain how 
this restriction would affect family law localism, but it certainly means 
that the question of local power to act in the first instance is pretty far 
from open and shut. 
To recap, in the absence of an express state grant, local power to 
act on family law matters is unlikely to exist for local governments 
subject to Dillon’s Rule.  However, it could exist in home rule 
jurisdictions, particularly in legislative home rule states that do not 
impose the private/civil law limitation. In those states the question 
would be whether these are matters that could be delegated to local 
governments.  Given that these are matters that affect the welfare of 
local residents, I assume the answer would be “yes, they are 
delegable” and, thus, presumed delegated.  In imperio states, the 
question would be whether these issues—such as child custody, 
property settlements, alimony and support—are local/municipal 
matters.  That is a more difficult question because although these 
matters surely affect local residents, they are also matters of state 
concern and historically have been treated as such. 
Professor Williams argues that one of the traditional arguments 
against local action—the value of statewide uniformity—is 
undermined in the divorce context because of the currently open-
ended nature of state standards and the resulting disuniformity in trial 
court decision-making.31 He may be right about that. On the other 
hand, I think he greatly understates the significance of the concern 
about the external effects of local actions, specifically, the impact that 
local rules will have on people outside the local jurisdiction, such as 
when a member of a divorcing couple moves away from the city 
                                                                                                                                         
 29. New Mexicans for Free Enter. v. City of Santa Fe, 126 P.3d 1149 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 2005) (holding local living wage ordinances regulates private relationships but is 
authorized by home rule grant as incidental to the local power to promote the general 
welfare of local employees). 
 30. Cf. Diller, supra note 28, at 1129-34, 1162-67 (arguing that the main effect of 
the private/civil law exception is to limit the ability of localities to authorize private 
citizens to bring private civil litigation to enforce local regulations of private 
behavior). 
 31. Williams, supra note 1, at 1115-17. 
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whose local law was initially applied, possibly taking the children. He 
summarily notes “this is not generally seen as a problem in the 
interstate context.”32  But what may not be a problem in dealing with 
just fifty states could become one when dealing with thousands of 
municipalities.  Multiple, varying local building, housing, and zoning 
codes within a state are feasible because they apply to properties that 
stay put within the regulating jurisdiction.  But applying different 
intrastate rules to people who can move around a state could cause 
burdensome legal complications. 
Probably the strongest argument for Professor Williams’s version 
of family law localism is the nature of the local laws that he proposes.  
By urging only local “rules of thumb” which would function as 
nonbinding norms that courts would have to consider but need not 
apply, he may be avoiding the uncertain legal status of local 
regulation of private or civil relationships by eschewing regulation.  
Like local challenges to the Patriot Act or declarations of nuclear-free 
zones,33 these would be local expressions of views rather than laws, 
albeit articulated like laws through the official medium of a city 
council enactment.  By falling below the level of laws and purporting 
not to bind, they might be consistent with even a relatively restricted 
definition of local power to act. 
B. Preemption 
Finding that a locality has power to act is only the first step in the 
determination of whether a local measure of a subject is valid.  With 
the relatively rare exception of matters in imperio states in which 
local regulation is protected from state displacement, most local 
measures are subject to preemption by state law.34  Preemption will 
occur when state law forbids local action on a subject, the local law is 
in conflict with state regulation, or state regulation is so pervasive that 
the state is said to “occupy the field” to the exclusion of local 
regulation.35  Professor Williams asserts that “state statutes that 
control alimony, child custody, and other family law matters do not 
contain express provisions preempting local law.”36  I will defer to 
him on that claim, observing only that the lack of express preemption 
is almost surely due to the assumption that this is an area in which 
                                                                                                                                         
 32. Id. at 1141. 
 33. See id. at 1111-12, 1124. 
 34. See generally BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 5, at 432-94. 
 35. See generally id. at 432-94. 
 36. Williams, supra note 1, at 1144. 
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there is no local power to act in the first place, thus rendering express 
preemption language unnecessary.  The real issues, then, are conflict 
and field preemption. 
As Professor Williams indicates, whether a local measure would be 
preempted on conflict or field theories would turn on what a state’s 
law actually says. If state law lays out the factors for a court to 
consider in making a judgment on an issue like custody or visitation 
or support, then a local effort to add criteria – even nonbinding rules 
of thumb – could very well be preempted. On a conflict analysis, the 
decision would turn on whether the state’s law would be treated as a 
floor— “at least these criteria must be considered, but the court may 
consider additional criteria”—or as a floor and a ceiling – “these 
criteria must and only these criteria may be considered.”37 On the one 
hand, as long as the local criteria are not themselves inconsistent with 
the state-listed criteria, there is arguably no conflict and the locally-
generated criteria could be added to the court’s consideration. On the 
other hand, the mere fact of adding new criteria means that the state-
listed criteria may be given less weight.  The factors going into a 
court’s determination of whether this is an appropriate area for local 
action in the first place could also influence its judgment as to 
whether the locally-added factors legitimately supplement or 
illegitimately crowd out the state’s factors. Given the state’s 
traditional control of family law, the likelihood of a finding of field 
preemption is even stronger than conflict preemption. 
But if, as Professor Williams contends, state law is more open-
ended and “invites judges to consider any other relevant factor” in 
addition to those specifically listed,38 then there would be no conflict 
preemption and probably no field preemption either. However, even 
with an “any other relevant factor” state law, the local government 
could not compel the state court to consider the factors the locality 
proposes. It would be up to the court to decide whether as a matter of 
state law a local legislature’s enactment of a family law resolution 
makes the content of that resolution relevant to the court’s 
disposition of the issue which is the subject of the resolution. The fact 
that a local government has authority to pass a resolution on a subject 
does not mean it can bind a state court’s determination of whether 
the local government’s position is relevant to the legal issue. The 
court would have to consider the appropriate role of local legislative 
bodies in the resolution of family law questions. 
                                                                                                                                         
 37. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 5, at 469-71 (discussing the role of 
floors and ceilings in preemption analysis). 
 38. Williams, supra note 1, at 1144. 
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II.  THE PLACE OF LOCAL LEGISLATURES IN RESOLVING FAMILY 
LAW DISPUTES 
The place of local legislative bodies in the resolution of family law 
disputes involves separate consideration of the role of the local and 
the role of the legislature.  Professor Williams focuses on some of the 
principal theoretical arguments for decentralization—the possibility 
of experimentation, openness to policy entrepreneurship, and the 
incentive for local political participation.39 Interestingly, he rejects 
“efficient sorting” as a justification for his proposal, even though, as 
he acknowledges, it is “a classic argument”40 for local decision-
making.  Efficient sorting is the idea that different people in different 
local areas have different policy preferences, so that decentralization 
which permits local policies to match the preferences of local 
majorities will make more people happy than higher level decision-
making which will impose a rule that the overall majority favors but 
local majorities oppose.  The sorting argument is a critical one for 
localism.  If each city were a perfect microcosm of the state as a 
whole, with the same division of opinion, then local policy actions will 
leave just as many people as unhappy policy losers as state decision-
making.  Professor Williams is probably right that few people are 
likely to select their home city or county based on local policies 
concerning child custody or alimony after divorce.  But views on these 
policies could conceivably correlate with differences in jurisdictional 
size and type (big city, small town, suburb, rural area); partisan 
political preference; race or ethnic composition; socio-economic 
status; or community lifestyle (“traditional values” evangelical vs. 
hipster).  If so, that is, if views on disputed family law issues correlate 
with demographic or cultural differences, then the case for family law 
localism is stronger.  If, on the other hand, the different “rules of 
thumb” adopted by different localities are likely to be more random, 
the case for localism is weaker, turning on the idea that local 
governments—unlike the gridlocked state—will actually take action 
and that the ability to adopt local rules would be an incentive for local 
political action. 
Of course, we already have local decision-making on family law 
issues—but by local judges, not city councils or county commissions.  
Trial judges in thirty-four states are locally elected; the remainder are 
appointed—usually by the governor based on the recommendation of 
                                                                                                                                         
 39. See Williams, supra note 1, at 1127-32. 
 40. Williams, supra note 1, at 1132. 
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a judicial selection commission—to serve in local districts.41 In some 
states, the appointed judges are subject to retention elections.42  As 
Professor Ethan Leib has explained, these judges are part of and 
reflect “a local legal culture.”43  Although part of the state judiciary, 
they often see themselves as “in the business of using statutory law to 
address and accommodate local needs and priorities.”44  When, as in 
the family law setting, “state judicial and statutory or 
pronouncements are ambiguous or vague,” local judges may already 
be inclined to take a localist approach to contested issues.45  Professor 
Leib defends such localist judging as long as the courts are staffed by 
professional lawyers, are subject to direct supervision by the state 
judiciary through appellate review, and are composed of elected 
judges.46 
But if the local election of state judges has already provided an 
opening for localist family law, why add local legislatures to the 
process?  I think there are two arguments for adding the legislatures, 
and two against. In favor of some form of modest local law-making, 
such as the rules of thumb Professor Williams proposes, legislative 
action would promote local level uniformity in family law and provide 
greater democratic engagement with family law decision-making.  Of 
course, the arguments against are exactly the same. 
With respect to uniformity, local legislative involvement could 
increase uniformity of decision-making within a locality.  If the city 
council adopts a rule of thumb and all the judges elected or appointed 
within that city follow it, there would be greater consistency and 
predictability of local decisions within that locality—even if the 
degree of variation within the state as a whole remains the same. On 
the other hand, identifying a particular rule with particular places—
and potentially with particular ethnic groups, party affiliations, and 
cultural commitments—could harden the divisions within a state and 
                                                                                                                                         
 41. See INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, 
Selection & Retention of State Judges: Methods from Across the Country 
http://iaals.du.edu/quality-judges/publications/selection-retention-state-judges-
methods-across-country [https://perma.cc/X6B8-BQSF]. 
 42. See, e.g., National Center for State Courts, Judicial Selection and Retention: 
Resource Guide, http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Judicial-Officers/Judicial-Selection-and-
Retention/Resource-Guide.aspx  
[https://perma.cc/BTJ5-JH4W]. 
 43. Ethan Leib, Localist Statutory Interpretation, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 897, 905 
(2013). 
 44. Id. at 908. 
 45. Id. at 927. 
 46. Id. at 929. 
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make approaches to family issues seem to turn on ineffable 
“community values” and moral judgments rather than the product of 
principled deliberation, and less subject to judicial review.47  
Professor Williams optimistically suggests that multiple, varying local 
rules will be followed by studies that generate a set of best practices 
that will ultimately lead to state-level action.48  But it is also possible 
that local rules will freeze divisions and stiffen the resistance of 
people in one part of the state to rules associated with another. 
The democratic case for local legislative involvement is also 
straightforward.  Although locally-elected judges have a democratic 
pedigree, local councils have an even stronger claim to representing 
community views and, especially, the diversity of views within the 
community.  Whereas trial court adjudication vests decision-making 
authority in the hands of a single individual, legislative bodies have 
plural membership, permitting disagreement and debate,49 and 
encouraging engagement by the broader community.  Even when 
both local judges and local legislators are elected, the larger size of 
the legislative body can enhance the representativeness and the 
deliberativeness of the decision.  On the other hand, given the 
nonbinding nature of the proposed rules of thumb, local legislators 
may be tempted to use the occasion of a debate on a question of 
family law to posture and make public statements intended to please 
a political audience rather than think through the implications of a 
decision.  This may be particularly likely if the issue involves an 
emotional, “hot-button” question. When the legislature is not 
responsible for the outcomes of actual cases, there may be a 
temptation to act irresponsibly.  Local rules of thumb may not be 
exactly “cheap talk”—they could have political as well as legal 
consequences50—but the lack of binding effect could make them an 
occasion for not-fully-thought-through action.  This may be 
particularly likely with respect to divorce-related issues that are the 
subjects of intensive lobbying, which could occur when conflicting 
members of the local matrimonial bar (say pro-husband vs. pro-wife) 
push for different resolutions that could be helpful to them in specific 
                                                                                                                                         
 47. See, e.g., Courtney G. Joslin, The Perils of Family Law Localism, 48 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 623, 634-54 (2014). 
 48. Williams, supra note 1, at 1127-30. 
 49. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, 54 MD. L. REV. 633, 
641-48 (1995). 
 50. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons of 
Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 589-90 (2006) (holding soft law 
measures are not necessarily cost-less “cheap talk”). 
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cases, and use campaign contributions to bolster the appeal of their 
positions. 
Professor Williams’s proposal is, in a sense, a “vertical” solution to 
what might be called a “horizontal” problem—the failure of state 
legislatures to provide courts with appropriately detailed laws that 
would result in more consistent resolution of disputed cases.  There is 
also arguably a vertical problem within the court system, with 
appellate courts not providing proper guidance to trial courts. It is not 
clear to me whether he believes that local legislative decision-making 
is actually the better way to resolve family law questions, or whether 
this is a second best solution to the failures of state-level institutions 
put forward in the hope that the local resolutions of these issues will 
be studied and provide a path toward state-level agreement.  
Decentralization is appropriate when the reasons for failure to 
resolve the problem at the higher level of government involve a deep 
disagreement over policies or values within the larger community but 
there is a greater degree of consensus on these issues within local 
governments.  Decentralization also makes sense when the 
differences in local needs, conditions or circumstances are so great 
that the law ought to take them into account because state-wide rules 
will not work well.  It is unclear whether this describes the family law 
setting. 
These comments are not intended to disagree with Professor 
Williams’s call for local legislatively-enacted rules of thumb.  Greater 
clarity and predictability in the law would be desirable, even if only at 
the local level, and the rules of thumb could facilitate that.  But I 
doubt this will “revolutioniz[e] family law.”51  Local decision-makers 
are already central to family law judgments.  Local legislative 
enactments might result in a more consistent, more democratically 
legitimate expression of community sentiments on these issues, but 
that could just as easily harden disagreements and inflame debates as 
provide the path Professor Williams seeks toward greater state-level 
rulification. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 51. See Williams, supra note 1, at 1161. 
